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Abstract: 
This paper discusses the recent development of Xinhuanet.com, a news 
website launched by Xinhua News Agency, one of China’s key central state-
owned news organisations. Xinhuanet Co. Ltd., the business entity running 
the website, went public in October 2016 in Shanghai. This marked the first 
step in the state news agency’s financialisation. Two main questions are 
addressed. First, what were the main driving forces behind Xinhuanet’s 
transformation from a governmental cultural organisation to a state-owned 
publicly traded enterprise, the majority shareholder of which remains 
Xinhua? Second, how should the nature of this transformation be 
understood, in relation to Xinhua’s wider marketisation process and that of 
the Chinese media sector as a whole? The paper argues that Xinhua’s 
financialisation via Xinhuanet is best understood as part of a state-
administrated initiative in accord with Xinhua’s own business ambitions. 
The financialisation of news by state players such as Xinhuanet does not 
alter the underlying ownership structure of Chinese news media, which 
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Financialisation of News in China in the Age of the 
Internet: The Case of Xinhuanet 
 
Introduction 
The financial sector is increasingly playing a central role not only in many countries’ 
macroeconomics and economic policies, but also in daily life (Harvey, 2007; 
Lapavitsas, 2013; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013). Inevitably, it has begun to exert its 
hegemonic influence on the production and circulation of news and current affairs. 
Bill Grantham and Toby Miller (2010:176) have vividly described what the 
phenomenon of financialisation of news and current affairs looks like in a liberal 
democracy: 
 
…stories are presented in terms of their monetary significance to investors. 
Leading news sources rely on finance reporting for much of their revenue. 
Business advisors dominate discussion on dedicated finance cable stations 
such as CNBC and Bloomberg and are granted the status of seers when they 
appear on MSNBC, CNN, and the networks. The focus of “news” has become 
stock markets, earnings, profits, and portfolio management. Journalists stalk 
politics in order to discredit democratic activities that might restrain capital. 
Labour news has been transmogrified into corporate news, and politics is 
measured in terms of its reception by business. Even the recent crisis has not 
eroded journalistic faith in reactionary solutions to a radical problem, as the 
bizarre press coverage of the meltdown indicates… 
 
Behind the financialised “look” of news, the core of the change brought about by the 
financialisation process lies in the ultimate shift in the pattern of capital accumulation 
as well as the logic of running businesses (Lapavitsas, 2013). Financialisation 
arguably leads to the tendency that “profit-making occurs increasingly through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner, 
2005:174). In other words, a multinational media corporation, for example, once it is 
completely financialised, will be able to “profit[ing] without producing”, at least in 
theory (Lapavitsas, 2013: 792-805).  
 
From a Marxist perspective, the emergence of financialisation in mature capitalist 
economies in the mid-1970s can be explained by the theory of surplus absorption: as 
the surplus derived from capitalist production became difficult to absorb by the 1970s, 
the financial sector rose to prominence and created all sorts of novel speculative 
financial tools to absorb/channel the surplus (Lapavitsas, 2013). However, the cause, 
content and form of the financialisation can vary from country to country according to 
different political, historical, institutional and social conditions (Lapavitsas and 
Powell, 2013). Financialisation in less developed economies has been largely seen as 
an outcome of financial globalisation, which has resulted in a rise in the volume of 
foreign capital flowing from advanced economies into less developed countries. 
Moreover, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has also stimulated the 
process of financialisation in the emerging economies. Despite its Marxist origin, 
financialisation remains a vaguely defined term in social science (Lapavitsas and 
Powell, 2013). In this paper, the term is employed broadly to refer to the tendency 
towards the increasing hegemonic power exerted by the financial sector on the non-
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financial sector in general and the media and communication sector specifically in the 
process of marketisation and globalisation. 
 
In the context of globalisation, the tendency towards financialisation of news, though 
still largely relevant to advanced economies, is now taking shape in less developed 
countries, such as China. However, little research has been done in the Chinese 
context (for one of the few exceptions, see Wang, 2017). In mainland China, the most 
influential state-owned news institutions, such as Xinhua News Agency, while largely 
maintaining their propaganda function, have been trying to financialise themselves in 
a way which is similar to what Grantham and Miller (2010) describe about their 
Western counterparts. Moreover, the government, led by the Communist Party of 
China (CPC), has been pressing them to speed up the transformation process since 
2009. To start with, the Chinese government approved and supported the public 
floatation of an important part of their businesses – Internet-based news operations. 
Yet, the causes of such a big move and its implications for Chinese media 
transformations have not been systematically studied.  
 
Against this background, this paper focuses on the case of Xinhuanet.com, a news 
website launched by the state news agency, Xinhua, in the late 1990s. Xinhuanet Co. 
Ltd., the business entity running the website, went public in October 2016 in 
Shanghai. This has marked a new milestone in the state news agency’s transformation 
towards financialisation, though it is still at a very early stage of development. Two 
main questions are addressed in this paper. First, what were the main driving forces 
behind Xinhuanet’s transformation from a governmental cultural organisation to a 
state-owned publicly traded enterprise, the majority shareholder of which remains 
Xinhua? Second, how should the nature of this transformation be understood, in 
relation to Xinhua’s wider marketisation process and that of the Chinese media sector 
as a whole? 
 
The analytical focus on a state-owned news organisation is what differentiates this 
paper from a recent study published by Xia and Fuchs (2017), one of the few English-
language studies on media financialisation in China, which instead focuses on 
privately-owned news portals and other Internet compani s. Under China’s current 
media and Internet regulatory framework, privately owned companies are banned 
from publishing self-produced original news content online. Instead, they have to rely 
on news produced by state-owned news sources. Thus, the financialisation of the 
privately-owned Internet companies has had only an indirect impact on news 
operations in mainland China. It is also worth noting that, until recently, only the non-
news businesses of state-owned news institutions were allowed to be commercialised. 
By October 2016, Xinhuanet had its own editorial staff, consisting of over 700 
members, including a large number of journalists licensed by the Chinese news 
authorities. Thus, Xinhuanet’s financialisation via the 2016 public floatation actually 
involved the commercialisation of news operations. Xinhuanet is the second state-
owned news website to go public in the country, following People.cn, the official 
website of People’s Daily, which become a listed company in 2012. In comparison 
with People.cn, Xinhuanet’s transformation was more complex, having gone through 
more ups and downs, along with the fluctuations of the Chinese stock market and 
changes in policy during the most recent decade. In this sense, the study of Xinhuanet 
is indicative of the extent to which it is possible to combine the status of state news 
agency with a developing journalism orientation that aims to serve the increasingly 
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influential financial sector, including shareholders. In seeking to answer the two key 
questions, the paper proceeds first by providing an overview of the debate on the 
nature of Chinese media transformation, in order to situate this study within its 
academic context.  
 
The Nature of Chinese Media Transformations 
Numerous studies have discussed media, communication and cultural transformation 
in China, a process underway since the start of the reform age in the late 1970s. The 
key question that scholars have grappled with is: how to understand the nature of the 
reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping and then continued by his successors over the 
past four decades? This issue is essential for understanding the nature of the 
transformations in Chinese media in general and of state-supported media 
financialisation in particular.  
 
As Yuezhi Zhao (2008: 106) points out, the changes in Chinese media generally, and 
the state-engineered media conglomeration commencing from the late 1990s 
specifically, have brought into sharp focus not only the theoretical issues that 
surround “the potentially conflictual relationship between the party and the state”, but 
also practical problems caused by “the complicated ways in which the ‘territorial’ and 
‘capitalist’ logics of power overlap, intertwine, and tug against each other at the 
central and local levels of the Chinese state”. In these circumstances, it is not 
surprising that many scholars have questioned the seemingly self-evident definition of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhao, 2008). Instead, they have described 
what China has evolved into over the past 40 years variously as “state capitalism” 
(Bremmer, 2008), “market socialism” (Amin, 2005; Hsu, 2007), “market Leninism” 
(Wright, 1994), “postsocialist experiments” (Rofel, 2013) or “commercialisation 
without independence” (Chan, 1993).  
 
For David Harvey, Deng’s reforms equate to “n oliberalism with Chinese 
characteristics”. They comprise of both “neoliberal elements” and “authoritarian 
centralised control” (Harvey, 2005: 120; cited by Zhao, 2008: 5). On the one hand, 
China has evidently embraced the neoliberal model of capitalist development in the 
process of integrating itself into the global capitalist system since the early 1980s 
(Harvey, 2007). As a result of that, the problem of over-accumulation characterised 
by overinvesting, overbuilding, overproduction and environmental degradation has 
occurred in China too (Harvey, 2007; Xia and Fuchs, 2017). On the other hand, state 
repression, though not unique to China, has always been apparent in the country 
(Harvey, 2007; Zhao, 2008). In fact, the party-state has in recent years further 
tightened its authoritarian centralised control over key sectors, including the media 
and communication sector – the traditional ideological territory of the ruling party 
(Zhao, 2015a). Thus, many scholars are inclined to describe what China has been 
doing as “state capitalism” (Xia and Fuchs, 2017). However, the party-state has never 
openly committed itself to neoliberalism but to socialism with Chinese characteristics 
or a socialist market economy (Zhao, 2008). In this sense, the case of China along 
with many other cases (e.g. the former Soviet Union) seems to indicate that the 
relationship between socialism and democracy might be as problematic as that 
between capitalism and democracy  (Zhao, 2008).  
 
For Samir Amin, socialism in China has not yet lost out to capitalism: “As long as the 
principle of equal access to land is recognised and is effectively implemented, it is not 
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too late for social action to successfully influence an as yet uncertain evolution” 
(Amin, 2005: 274-5). In line with Amin, Arrighi suggests that “the nature of 
development in China is not necessarily capitalist” in spite of “the spread of market 
exchanges in the pursuit of profit” (Arrighi, 2007: 24). He also recognises that this 
“does not mean that socialism is alive and well in Communist China, nor that it is a 
likely outcome of social action”. In comparison with Arrighi, Lin Chun's view on the 
future outcome of China’s reforms seems more optimistic (Lin, 2013). According to 
Lin, if China manages to overcome its key developmental problems, it will be able to 
offer a socialist “China model”, which will serve as a promising alternative to 
capitalist development. However, Lin acknowledges many social problems that China 
needs to overcome, ranging from rising inequality to environmental degradation, from 
the decline of public services to the rise of urban unemployment (Lin, 2006 and 2013).  
 
In agreement with Amin, Arrighi (2007: 24) contends, “even if socialism has already 
lost out in China, capitalism, by this definition, has not yet won”. More importantly, 
Arrighi (2007:24) sees “the social outcome of China’s titanic modernisation effort” as 
an “indeterminate” process. Therefore, he suggests that “socialism and capitalism as 
understood on the basis of past experience may not be the most useful notions with 
which to monitor and comprehend the evolving situation” in China (Arrighi, 2007: 
24). Arrighi also acknowledges that there has been “a new awareness among a 
growing group of scholars that there is a fundamental world-historical difference 
between processes of market formation and process of capitalist development” 
(Arrighi, 2007: 24). In this sense, the confusions about “the relationship between 
market economy, capitalism, and economic development”, exemplified by the case of 
China, are “as much theoretical as they are practical” and “it is entirely possible, 
indeed likely, that they will be resolved in practice before they are resolved in theory” 
(Arrighi, 2007:17).  
 
Yet, this does not mean that discussing theoretical concerns associated with China’s 
economic and social transformations is not worthwhile, including more specifically 
those undergone by the media, communication and cultural sector. Quite the opposite, 
Arrighi’s suggestion on how to deal with the theoretical confusions generated by 
Chinas unique trajectory is a call for developing new theoretical perspectives to 
provide more adequate explanations of social realities in countries other than the US 
and the UK. With a similar goal in mind, a number of communication scholars have 
called for the de-Westernising of communication studies, drawing on cases from 
diverse geopolitical locations and cultural backgrounds, including China (Curran and 
Park, 2000; Fuchs, 2016; Thussu, 2009; Waisbord and Mellado, 2014). More recently, 
there has been a call for international communication scholars to broaden their 
horizons and take into account the ongoing global power shift accelerated by the rise 
of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (Nordenstreng and 
Thussu, 2015; Zhao, 2015a and 2015b). As a key player in this grouping, China has 
unavoidably become a focus of debate in discussions on the BRICS. In this context, 
there is growing attention on how Chinese media are seeking to exert more influence 
on the outside world, marking a move away from an exclusive focus on Western 
media’s influence on China (Zhao, 2015a). The effort by the Chinese state “in 
projecting its soft power through its media and communication systems” has thus 
become a popular research subject in recent years (Zhao, 2015a: 23). It is also the 
case that every step that a state-owned central media institution like Xinhua takes 
towards conglomeration and marketisation can now be explained and justified in 
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relation to the state’s soft power ambitions. However, the “soft power” concept itself 
is not without theoretical flaws, and arguably looking at contemporary developments 
through the soft power theoretical lens has prevented gaining an understanding of the 
more nuanced changes to Chinese media and journalism (Sparks, 2015; Zhao, 2013). 
This “soft-power-for-all” approach certainly does not help gain a full picture of the 
Chinese media, consisting of “a huge and complex set of institutions” (Sparks, 
2012:65). Thus, as suggested by Colin Sparks (2012:65), it is important “to try to 
understand all of their [Chinese media] aspects if we want to understand Chinese 
society, and particularly if we wish to discover some sense of the potential and likely 
direction of change”. In keeping with this recommendation, this paper looks into a 
relatively under-researched aspect of media development in contemporary China, a 
phenomenon also overlooked in earlier research on Xinhua (Author removed, 2006 
and 2012). 
 
Why Did Xinhuanet Go Public?  
On 28th October 2016 Xinhuanet launched its initial public offering (IPO) on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. This was just a month after receiving official approval for 
the IPO, for which Xinhua had prepared for six years (Xinhua, 2016b)1. After such a 
long time waiting, the timing of the IPO did not seem to be favourable to Xinhuanet. 
In January 2016 turmoil had just hit the country’s stock exchanges hard and there had 
been spill-over effects on the major global markets (Allen and Phillips, 2016). In 
addition, the country’s economy was continuing to slow down. According to Chinese 
official statistics, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.7% in 2016 
in comparison with 6.9% a year earlier, reaching the lowest level since 1990 (BBC, 
2017). The deepening of China’s economic slowdown, described as the “New 
normal” by Chinese authorities, triggered a new round of debate about China’s future 
and its likely contribution to the already turbulent world economy (Peston, 2015). In 
contrast to China’s general economic slowdown, however, its Internet economy was 
still booming (Xia and Fuchs, 2017). According to Alexa, an American website-
ranking service, seven of the world’s top 20 Internet companies in 2017 were based in 
mainland China2. The vast majority of them (19 out of 20) are non-state-owned. The 
domestic Internet market is dominated by three key players, namely Baidu, Alibaba 
and Tencent (BAT) – all publicly-traded companies. However, from around 2010 and 
especially after 2015, there has also been a start-up boom (Xia and Fuchs, 2017). On 
the one hand, BAT continues to monopolise the domestic industry via acquisitions 
and financial investments. On the other hand, the government encourages young 
graduates to start up their own businesses in order to offset the short-term social 
impact of increased unemployment resulting from the economic slow-down. BAT’s 
ongoing process of monopolist accumulation via acquisitions and financial 
investments in tandem with the start-up boom is arguably stimulating the Internet 
bubble in China, increasing the volatility of the country’s stock market (Xia and 
Fuchs, 2017). In terms of market share, Xinhuanet can be placed alongside other 
state-controlled news websites (the so-called “state players”), in-between the above 
two categories. In its list of top Chinese and global websites (as of the end of April 
2017), Alexa ranked Xinhuanet in 28th place and 151st place respectively.3 Although 
Xinhuanet was ahead of People.cn and many other Chinese state players in terms of 
popularity (as measured by site traffic), it still lagged far behind non-state-owned 
Chinese news portals such as sohu.com and sina.com.cn. Given all these factors, 2016 
was arguably not the best year for Xinhuanet to go public. So how is it possible to 
account for Xinhuanet’s decision to go public nevertheless? 
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First of all, there are profit-maximising motives behind any IPO (Fuchs, 2011). Such 
was the case for Xinhuanet’s. In its 2016 IPO prospectus Xinhuanet stated that the 
company aimed to raise nearly RMB41.5bn (US$230m) of capital, accounting for 25% 
of its total shares (Xinhua, 2016a). Xinhuanet’s fund-raising target for its IPO was 
compatible with People.cn’s. The latter raised nearly RMB1.4bn (US$219m) of 
capital from its 2012 IPO, almost three times more than the original target 
(Rabinovitch, 2012). Undoubtedly, People.cn’s successful IPO set a good precedent 
for Xinhuanet. According to Xinhuanet’s IPO document, the funds raised via the IPO 
would be used for the company’s future infrastructure and business investments, 
including expanding the company’s multimedia business, cloud service, mobile 
Internet service and online education (Xinhua, 2016b). Xinhuanet’s business 
incentives thus can be explained by Karl Marx and his followers’ theory of capital 
accumulation via financialisation: it was a decision grounded on the “money that 
produces money” formula (Marx 1894: 515; Xia and Fuchs, 2017:4). However, since 
Xinhuanet remains a majority state-owned company even after becoming a publicly-
traded company, it still has to justify its profit-maximising strategies, especially when 
the latter are in conflict with the website’s function of serving the party-state’s 
ideology. Moreover, it is also important to note that Xinhuanet anticipated that the 
capital generated by the IPO was unlikely to cover the full cost of the proposed new 
projects and stated that if needed would raise extra funds through other means 
(Xinhuanet, 2016). 
 
Even if the profit incentives are clear, becoming a publicly traded company at a 
turbulent moment was a risky way of financing Xinhuanet (Yang, 2016). The Chinese 
stock market has certain distinctive characteristics, a brief review of which can help 
gain a better understanding of Xinhuanet’s move towards capitalisation. Firstly, 
China’s stock market is still playing a relatively small role in financing the country’s 
real economy. In 2015 only 5% of total financing flows to the country’s real economy 
came from the domestic stock market (Yang, 2016). Thus, even a big fall, like the one 
of 23% which occurred in early 2016, has little impact on China’s economy in spite of 
its spill-over effect on global markets (Yang, 2016). Secondly, stocks issued in China, 
particularly A shares that are priced in Chinese local curr ncy (Renminbi or RMB), 
tend to be valued higher than those issued in Hong Kong and the US. This is 
especially the case for the shares of cultural and media enterprises. In 2015 the 
average Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio5 of A shares in China was 17.61, but in the cultural 
and media sector -- almost 100, nearly six times the P/E ratio of the shares issued by 
similar companies in Hong Kong and the USA (Publishers, 2016). This highly 
speculative aspect of the Chinese stock market makes it relatively easy for companies 
like Xinhuanet to raise funds via IPO in mainland China. However, this feature, by 
making the Chinese stock market particularly volatile, also means that listed 
companies face higher risk (Xia and Fuchs, 2017).  
 
Still, the reasons identified and discussed so far cannot fully justify Xinhuanet’s 
move. This especially was the case in the circumstances, as the aftermath of the most 
recent turmoil was still being felt and the next one seemed likely to be under way (Xia 
and Fuchs, 2017). The next question arising then is: Did Xinhuanet have at its 
disposal an alternative way to raise funds for its future development? 
 
A review of Xinhuanet’s financial data and capital operations prior to its IPO in 2016 
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suggests a positive answer to this question. Before going public, Xinhuanet was the 
second most profitable enterprise owned by Xinhua. Since 2011 there has been a 
steady rise in the company’s annual income and net profit (Xinhuanet, 2014 and 
2016). In 2013 Xinhuanet contributed about 8% of Xinhua’s total annual revenue, 
earning RMB460m (about US$66.7m) in business revenue and RMB167m (about 
US$24.2m) in net profit. The last two figures rose respectively by 39.4 % and 22.8 % 
year on year. In the first three quarters of 2016, Xinhuanet’s revenue grew by 47 % in 
comparison with the previous year, reaching RMB795m (about US$115.3m). The net 
profit attributable to initial shareholders amounted at RMB161m (about US$23.3m), a 
growth of 6% compared to the same period in 2015. Xinhuanet’s major source of 
revenue came from online advertising, contributing RMB348m (about US$50.5m) or 
55% of the company’s total income in 2014. The other main sources of revenue 
included information services, website maintenance and technical support and mobile 
Internet services. In addition, Xinhuanet received governmental subsidies, amounting 
to 9% of its annual net profit between 2011 and 2013. Xinhuanet took also an active 
part in capital operations in recent years, including while waiting for its IPO. In 
March 2015 Xinhuanet invested RMB70m (about US$10.2m) to for purchasing 5,42 
million stock shares of Shanghai YC Culture Media Co. Ltd., an online advertising 
service provider in China. Later that year, in June, Xinhuanet invested another 
RMB130m (about US$18.9m) to establish the Xinhua Kangmei Healthcare Thinktank 
Co. Ltd. in collaboration with Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (Qian, 2016). These 
two major investments suggest that Xinhuanet had sufficient funds for business 
operations prior to the IPO (Qian, 2016). 
 
It is worth noting that the total amount of funds raised by Xinhuanet via the IPO was 
much more than the company’s annual operating income between 2011 and 2016. 
However, this also implies more business risks for Xinhuanet to take on for the 
reasons explained earlier. On 6th March 2017 Xinhuanet’s market capitalisation 
reached RMB17.151bn (about US$2.49bn), nearly three times the value of Xinhua’s 
total annual income in 20156. Xinhuanet’s P/E ratio was 47.46, much higher than, for 
instance, Thompson Reuters’s 31.96. The latter’s market capitalisation on 6th March 
2017 was about US$31.16bn7. As I will discuss in the following section, Xinhua’s 
main goal for many years had been reaching the status of global news agency on a par 
with Reuters (currently Thomson Reuters). To some extent, this continues to be 
Xinhua’s chief aspiration. 
 
In short, the discussion so far has argued that profit-maximising incentives only partly 
explain Xinhuanet’s move towards financialisation. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the driving forces behind the process, and the main implications for 
Xinhua’s development as a whole, it is necessary to review briefly the history of 
Xinhuanet in the context of the marketisation and conglomeration Xinhua has 
undergone over the past four decades. 
 
From Marketisation to Financialisation 
Prior to the launch of Xinhuanet, Xinhua endeavoured to become a financially 
independent news institution by 2000, willingly receiving a reduced amount of 
governmental subsidies each year for nearly two decades (Author removed, 2012). 
Throughout this period, fighting for financial independence was part of Xinhua’s 
ambition to become a “world-class news agency”, comparable with the likes of 
Reuters and Associated Press (AP). Given its state ownership, conceivably financial, 
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rather than editorial, independence was seen as an achievable goal. Gaining financial 
independence was also seen as instrumental in offsetting the negative impact of state 
ownership on Xinhua’s credibility overseas. Xinhua was certainly not the only news 
agency to be concerned about both its ownership status and its sources of financing. 
In fact, even Reuters, before going public in the 1980s, believed that its private 
ownership status put it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis AP, a cooperative news agency (see 
Read, 1999).  
 
Until today, however, Xinhua has not yet achieved complete financial independence 
from state subsidies (Author removed, 2012). The process of marketisation Xinhua 
has undergone over the past four decades has led to a mixed pattern of financing. In 
2016 over 50% of Xinhua’s annual income was generated by the agency itself and the 
rest came from state subsidies (Xinhuanet, 2016). This mixed pattern of financing has 
been widely adopted by state-owned Chinese media organisations over the past forty 
years. On the one hand, the state’s financial support enables state-run news 
organisations like Xinhua to survive in an increasingly competitive news market. On 
the other hand, it helps the CPC to justify its control over news content production. 
However, neither the government nor state-owned news organisations see state 
subsidies as an optimal form of financing media conglomerates “with Chinese 
characteristics”. In these circumstances, both the government and the state-owned 
news institutions like Xinhua started looking for a new source of financing in late 
2008 and early 2009. I shall elaborate this point in the following section. 
 
Despite Xinhua’s ambition, Xinhuanet was not conceived as a well-designed business 
venture for the news agency. As withPeople.cn, Xinhuanet was established as part of 
the state’s top-down efforts to enhance its online propaganda activities targeting 
foreign audiences in the late 1990s (Peng, 2005; Wei, 2016). In other words, 
Xinhuanet was born to serve the CPC’s ideological purposes. In addition to its 
ideological function, Xinhuanet’s business and journalistic functions emerged and 
then evolved along with Xinhua’s own business and news strategies in the 2000s, 
especially since 2009 (Author removed, 2006 and 2012). 
 
On 7th November 1997 Xinhua officially launched its news website, xinhua.org, 
renamed xinhuanet.com in 2000 (Xinhuanet, 2014; Xinhua, 2006c). It took a couple 
of years for Xinhua to figure out what to do with the website. On 1st November 2000, 
the State Council’s Information Office (SCIO) and the then Ministry of Information 
Industry of China announced “Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Websites Engaged in News Posting Operations”. According to the document, “any 
website which intends to post news articles on the Internet must first receive a permit 
from the government”8. Only news websites owned and run by existing state-owned 
news organisations, such as Xinhuanet and People.cn, were permitted to produce 
original news content as well as post news produced by their own journalists. In 
December 2000 Xinhuanet was granted a permit by the SCIO to produce and post 
news online. Meanwhile, Xinhua updated its website, and started using the website to 
release news online, mostly produced by its own journalists.  
 
Serving mostly as a free information window on China as part of the state’s online 
foreign propaganda project, Xinhuanet’s popularity was in some ways in tension with 
Xinhua’s news wholesale business, still based on offline wire services in the early 
2000s. Via Xinhua’s website, individual Internet users were able to access Xinhua’s 
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main news coverage directly without the agency of other retail news outlets, such as 
newspapers and TV stations. For traditional news agencies like Xinhua, which mostly 
remained invisible in the offline world, releasing news online was a big step towards 
becoming less dependent on other media outlets to reach out to audiences directly in 
the online world. Invisibility used to be one of the major concerns of Xinhua 
journalists, due to its negative impact on the issue of “news landing” in the offline 
environment (Author removed, 2012). For Xinhua, however, the greater visibility 
gained online via Xinhuanet in addition to the provision of free online access to the 
agency’s main news coverage inevitably clashed with the interests of the media 
outlets subscribing to Xinhua’s wholesale news. Both Xinhua and Xinhuanet tried to 
minimize such conflicts. One of the main solutions was to run the website as a 
business unit separated from the main editorial and wire news provision sectors of 
Xinhua. Another solution was to let the website establish its own editorial team, 
differentiating the content of Xinhuanet’s own news releases from that of Xinhua’s 
wire news. This approach later also helped Xinhua to fully explore the website’s 
business potential, especially after 2009.  
 
Firstly, Xinhuanet gained personnel independence from Xinhua’s headquarters. This 
was a crucial step for Xinhuanet to transform itself from a government-affiliated 
institution into an enterprise. In 2010, the state quota on the size of Xinhuanet’s staff, 
especially regarding the number of “party cadres” employed, was removed (Xinhua, 
2014). This granted Xinhuanet the autonomy to recruit its general employees, 
including journalists, according to its own business needs. This also means that 
Xinhuanet’s employees are no longer treated as party-carders – a privileged social 
status that is still enjoyed by the vast majority of Xinhua’s employees. Since 2010, 
Xinhuanet has expanded quickly. Its current editorial board alone consists of over 700 
contract-based employees. 
 
Xinhuanet’s journalists are responsible for selecting and editing (mostly) Xinhua 
news wires for the news website. They are also given more or less the same 
opportunity as Xinhua’s journalists to collect original material for general news 
reporting, both at home and abroad. However, when it comes to covering politically 
sensitive events, Xinhuanet’s journalists, particularly those who are newly-employed, 
arguably require “special supervision” from Xinhua/Xinhuanet’s senior editors (Yuan, 
Zhou and Weng, 2014:19). Xinhuanet’s editors still have to rely on Xinhua’s news 
wires for guidelines. This, on the one hand, implies that Xinhuanet’s directly-
recruited employees are still not seen to be as politically reliable as Xinhua’s party-
cadre-journalists are. On the other hand, this demonstrates that Xinhuanet has gained 
only a relative editorial autonomy from Xinhua in the process of transformation. In 
this respect, neither media marketisation nor financialisation has resulted in the 
editorial independence of Xinhuanet, in spite of the changes in its personnel and 
financing patterns.  
 
The Party-State’s “Unswerving” Support 
Xinhuanet’s financialisation, similar to People.cn’s, can be seen as “part of the 
government's push to commercialise the state-controlled news websites to make them 
more competitive in a fast-changing industry” (Xinhua, 2016a). 
 
Two key documents, issued by the party-state in 2009 and 2011, created an enabling 
environment for People.cn and Xinhuanet to go public. The first one was unveiled by 
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the SCIO in September 2009 as “A working plan for a pilot programme about 
transforming key news websites into enterprises”. The key news websites the 
document referred to included three central state-owned news websites, namely 
People.cn, Xinhuanet and CCTV.cn, as well as a number of local state-owned news 
websites.  In these circumstances, both People.cn and Xinhuanet became part of the 
state’s reform experiment to test how far state-owned news organisations could be 
commercialised without being privatised and how they could remain under the 
ideological control of the CPC. Two years later, the importance and urgency of the 
financialisation reform via the pilot programme had been readdressed and further 
clarified by the Central Committee of the CPC in another document – “Decision of 
the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Deepening Reform of the 
Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Flourishing of Socialist 
Culture”. The latter document was unveiled at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 
Seventeenth CPC Central Committee on 18th October 20119. In this document, the 
party-state under the then leadership of Hu Jintao revealed its ambition to become a 
global socialist cultural power, in which publicly-owned enterprises would become 
dominant and coexist with enterprises under other forms of ownership. In order to 
achieve this, the government and the party expressed their intention that cultural 
industries in China would become “a pillar industry” by the end of 2015, increasing 
their share in the country’s GDP up to 5% (Zhang, 2011). To accelerate the 
development of cultural industries in the country, priority along with “unswerving” 
support would be given to “state-owned cultural enterprises and those with a 
controlling share held by the state” for their business expansion (CPCCC, 2011). The 
types of support from the party-state were specified as follows: “investment approval, 
loans, land use, tax breaks, stock market financing, bond issues, foreign trade and 
application for special funds” (CPCCC, 2011). One of the major tasks set between 
2011 and 2015 was to “cultivate large and highly competitive state-owned cultural 
enterprises or enterprise groups and those with a controlling share held by the state, 
and get them to play a leading role in developing cultural industries” in China 
(CPCCC, 2011). Non-government capital would be allowed to “participate in the 
transformation of state-owned for-profit cultural institutions into enterprises”, playing 
a supplementary role “in implementing major cultural projects and constructing 
cultural industry parks” (CPCCC, 2011). However, non-government capital would 
remain subject to strict supervision and regulation.  
 
In the meantime, controlling the online public sphere, as China’s huge online 
population kept growing, had become a major concern of the ruling party (Yang, 
2009). The two policy documents also served to address such concern, supporting the 
“most loyal members” of the Internet services, particularly those run by central Party 
organs, in their efforts to become more competitive vis-à-vis popular commercial 
news portals such as Sohu and Sina. 
 
The 2011 policy guidelines played a particularly important role in speeding up the 
process for People.cn to go public. Just a few months after the CPC’s Decision was 
announced, the IPO for People.cn was approved by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). The external conditions needed for Xinhuanet to follow suit 
were also put in place. Against this background, Xinhuanet started its transformation 
from a governmental cultural organisation to an enterprise.  
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However, it took Xinhuanet longer than People.cn to go through this process of 
internal transformation. Xinhua’s reform plan was approved by SCIO in May 2011. In 
May 2011 Xinhuanet Corporation Ltd. was officially established (Xinhuanet, 2017). 
In 2012, Xinhuanet first set up its own around-the-clock news centre in addition to 
Xinhua’s existing ones. Then the corporation reformed its shareholding structure, 
inviting eight new strategic investors – all state-owned or controlled – in addition to 
Xinhua and its two business affiliations to join in. When Xinhuanet eventually 
submitted its first IPO application in early 2013, the whole stock market in the 
country was experiencing a retreat: The CSRC had stopped approving new stock 
listings in that year. In mid-2014, after the CSRC’s approval procedure resumed, 
Xinhuanet submitted its second application (Xinhua, 2016a). In October 2016, 
Xinhuanet officially went public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Xinhua, 2016c).  
 
As of the end of July of 2017 Xinhua (together with its two business affiliates) still 
holds nearly 64% of the shares in Xinhuanet (Xinhuanet, 2017). Furthermore, 
Xinhuanet’s other seven largest shareholders also represent state-run/owned bodies. 
They now jointly hold over 11% of Xinhuanet’s shares (Xinhuanet, 2017). Among 
them there are the National Council for Social Security Fund, China Cultural 
Industries Investment Fund, Nanfang Media Group, Jiangsu Broadcasting 
Corporation, China Telecommunications Corporation and China Unicom. A process 
of cross-sector and cross-regional convergence in terms of financing is clearly 
underway. However, there are strict rules in place establishing under which conditions 
these state shareholders can sell what percentage of their shares in Xinhuanet and to 
whom (Xinhuanet, 2016). This minimises the risk that Xinhuanet’s financialisation 
could lead to its privatisation. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this paper has shown that a number of factors interacted, 
leading to Xinhuanet’s decision to seek a new source of financing through the 
domestic stock market. In addition to the party-state’s top-down policy on media 
financialisation, relevant factors included Xinhua’s long-standing ambition to become 
a global news agency and more recently its quest for further business expansion in an 
increasingly competitive news market.  
 
Xinhuanet’s financialisation also needs to be understood in the wider context of 
Chinese media transformation. China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in 2001, the long preparation for and the successful hosting of the Beijing 
Olympics in 2008 and the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the same year – all 
these events reoriented the priorities of Chinese media in the new millennium (Hu, 
2003; Finlay and Xin, 2009; Zhao, 2008, 2015a and 2015b). The state-engineered 
process of media conglomeration and consolidation started in the mid-1990s. The 
initial goal was to help Chinese state media to grow bigger and stronger so to enable 
them to “dance” (read: compete at home) with “the wolves” (read: transnational 
media conglomerates) (Hu, 2003; Zhao, 2008). Since 2002 the process of media 
conglomeration has slowed down and has been gradually replaced by the “Going 
abroad” project. The latter encourages state-owned central and local media, including 
the newly formed media conglomerates, to expand their business overseas, especially 
in countries and regions of strategic importance to China, in order to enhance the 
country’s soft power (Zhao, 2013). The “Going abroad” project gained momentum in 
2009 when many financially struggling media companies in the West began to cut 
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jobs. In the same year Xinhua began to accelerate its international expansion under 
the “Going abroad” project. By the end of January 2017 Xinhua had established over 
180 overseas bureaus in major cities of the world. From reorganising businesses at 
home to expanding its news infrastructure abroad, Xinhua’s trajectory has been 
largely in line with the major trends of Chinese media transformations in the first 
decade of the new millennium. During this period, the key rationale behind the 
decision to let state-run news organisations merge into fewer and bigger media 
conglomerates has changed too. If in the early 2000s it was primarily a defensive 
move designed to counter the impact of Western “media imperialism”, since 2009 it 
has been a pro-active move aiming for China to play a leading role in the process of 
media globalisation. As a result, a new type of media conglomerate, exemplified by 
Xinhua, has emerged (Boyd-Barrett, 2015). 
 
In addition, Xinhua’s financialisation via Xinhuanet, while serving the main purpose 
of diversifying the state agency’s sources of financing, cannot be seen primarily as the 
natural outcome of market competition and capital accumulation. Rather, it must be 
seen as part of a state-administrated initiative, which has been in accord with 
Xinhua’s own business ambitions. Thus, unlike Xinhua’s earlier efforts to achieve 
financial independence, which represented mostly a bottom-up initiative by the state 
news agency, Xinhuanet’s recent financialisation is best understood as the outcome of 
both a top-down state administration and a bottom-up initiative. The ultimate goal of 
this is to reinforce, instead of weakening, the state news agency’s function of serving 
the party-state’s ideology, in additi n to its other purposes. 
 
The financialisation of news by state players such as Xinhuanet does not alter the 
underlying ownership structure of Chinese news media, which remain ultimately 
state-controlled. As the majority shareholder of Xinhuanet, Xinhua remains a not-for-
profit state news agency, still enjoying a monopoly in mainland China. In this respect, 
the state-supported financialisation, similar to the state-engineered process of 
conglomeration and marketisation, has not changed the nature of the Chinese media 
as a whole. 
 
Neither media marketisation nor financialisation has brought Xinhuanet full editorial 
independence despite the change in its personnel and financing patterns. In spite of 
the rise of privately owned Internet companies (e.g. BAT), the party-state still largely 
maintains authoritarian ideological control over online news flows within mainland 
China in order to the serve the goal to build “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. 
In this sense, both Amin and Arrighi are right in suggesting that capitalism has not 
won in the country. This is at least the case as far as the media sector is concerned. 
Meanwhile, the still tight centralised authoritarian ideological control reminds the rest 
of world how far “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is from Marx’s socialist 
project. 
 
Nevertheless, the public float of Xinhuanet and People.cn has certainly opened up a 
road for the financial sector to intervene in the battle for hegemonic control over 
online news flows in China. How will the process of financialisation of news be 
unfolded in China in the years to come? Will it lead to further media concentration, 
similar to the situation found in more developed media markets, such as the US and 
the UK (McChesney, 2015; Paterson, 2005)? What will be the impact on news 
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content? Further research on Xinhuanet and People.cn needs to be done in order to 
answer these questions. 
 
Notes 
1. Xinhuanet firstly applied for an IPO in early 2013, but its application was suspended as the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) stopped approving new stock listings in the year. The 
second application was submitted in mid-2014 after the CSRC’s approval procedure resumed. 
2. http://www.alexa.com/topsites accessed on 29 April 2017. 
3. http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/xinhuanet.com accessed on 29 April 2017. 
4. RMB (Renminbi) is the official currency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 1 Renminbi was 
approximately equivalent to 0.14 US Dollar according to XE Currency Converter. 
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?From= &To=CNY accessed on 2 May 2017.  
5. Price/Earnings ratio is calculated by dividing the current stock price of a listed company by its 
earnings per share. Price refers to the company’s current stock price, while earnings refers to its net 
profit per share for the most recent twelve-month period.  
6. http://www.google.com.hk/finance?q=SHA:603888 accessed on 6 March 2017. 
7. https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/quote/TRI.TO?ltr=1 accessed on 6 March 2017. 
8. https://www.cecc.gov/prior-restraints accessed on 27 February 2017. 
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